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1. Introduction
In November 1713, in a letter to Nicolas Bernoulli, the Marquis Pierre Rémond de Montmort (see ‘‘Essay d’analyse sur les
jeux de hazard’’, [7, p. 406]) proposed the following game which seemed unsolvable to him: ‘‘A father wants to give a new
year’s gift to his son and says to him that he will hide in his hand a token with a natural number, ‘‘even’’ or ‘‘odd’’. If his
son says ‘‘even’’ (respectively, ‘‘odd’’) and the token is ‘‘even’’ (respectively, ‘‘odd’’), then he will give 4 (respectively, 1) ecus
to his son; else he will give 0 ecu to his son’’. Then Montmort asks several questions. Which rules should be prescribed to
the father (respectively, to the son) in order that he loses (respectively, earns) a little (respectively, a lot of) money? How
much money will the son earn if each player follows the most advantageous way for him? Various mathematicians studied
extensions of this game, now called (finite) zero-sum two-player games in ‘‘normal form’’. They proposed ‘‘solutions’’ now
called equilibria using mixed strategies. In the Montmort example, the most advantageous way for each player is to play
‘‘even’’ with probability 15 , and ‘‘odd’’ with probability
4
5 ; then the expected payoff of the son is
4
5 . In the particular case of
finite symmetric zero-sum two-player games with at most five pure strategies, Borel [2–4] showed the existence of (at least)
an equilibrium. Among these games, the ‘‘Rock–Paper–Scissors’’ game or its extension ‘‘Rock–Paper–Scissors–Well’’ (see
Example 1) are widely known. Later, von Neumann [19,18] and Nash (see [16,17]) proved the existence of ‘‘Nash equilibria’’
in every finite n-player game. Notice that generally such equilibria are not unique; however, some uniqueness theorems
have been proved for certain symmetric two-player zero-sum finite games (see [11–13]).
The study of infinite two-player zero-sum games is more difficult since the ‘‘minimax theorem’’ for an arbitrary bounded
matrix does not hold anymore (consider, for example, thematrix of the reverse (usual) strict order onNwithout any greatest
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element [20, p. 182]), so Nash’s theorem cannot be applied to infinite zero-sum two-player games in normal form. However,
some results for infinite games were obtained: for example, Méndez-Naya ([14, Th. 4.3 p. 228], [15, Th. 4 p. 84]) showed the
existence of a value for certain bounded infinite matrices in which every row converges.
In this paper, we consider the notion of modular partition for a bounded skew-symmetric (finite or infinite) matrix M .
Denoting byQ the quotientmatrix ofM through amodular partition,we then prove that everyNash equilibriumof (the zero-
sum, two-player game associated to)M allows to compute a Nash equilibrium of Q (Theorem 1), and also, Nash equilibria of
restrictions ofM to the modules of positive weight with respect to the equilibrium ofM (Theorem 2). A converse statement
providing Nash equilibria of M knowing Nash equilibria of Q and of the restrictions of M also holds (Theorem 3). Notice
that this converse statement is linked to the composition consistency property in finite tournaments (see [11]). We then
prove that, ifM has a value, Q also has a value (Theorem 4). We define the upper value of a bounded matrix, and, we show
(Theorem 5) that the upper value ofM is the upper value of Q +D, where D is the diagonal matrix of the upper values of the
(restrictions ofM to its) modules. Finally, we describe various examples of computations of Nash equilibria or upper values
in infinite oriented graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall Nash equilibria of the game associated to a (finite or infinite)
bounded real matrix; in Section 3 we define modules and modular partitions of a skew-symmetric matrix; in Sections 4
(respectively, 5 and 6) we prove theorems for Nash equilibria (respectively, values and upper values) of a skew-symmetric
boundedmatrixM in the context of modular partitions; finally, in Section 7, we apply our results to various oriented graphs.
2. Nash equilibria of bounded matrices
2.1. Bounded matrices
Given a set I , ℓ1(I) denotes the space of X = (xi)i∈I ∈ RI such that ∥X∥1 := i∈I |xi| < +∞, and ℓ∞(I) denotes the
space of X = (xi)i∈I ∈ RI such that ∥X∥∞ := supi∈I |xi| < +∞. Given sets I, J , a real matrix M = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J is bounded
if ∥M∥∞ := supi∈I;j∈J |ai,j| < +∞. Every bounded matrix M defines a continuous linear mapping from ℓ1(J) to ℓ∞(I),
associating to every Y = (yi)i∈J ∈ ℓ1(J) (viewed as a one-columnmatrix) the elementMY := (j∈J ai,jyj)i∈I of ℓ∞(I); notice
that ∥MY∥∞ ≤ ∥M∥∞∥Y∥1. We denote by ⟨., .⟩ : ℓ1(I)× ℓ∞(I)→ R the continuous bilinear mapping associating to every
X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ℓ1(I) and every Y = (yi)i∈I ∈ ℓ∞(I), the real numberi∈I xiyi. We denote by βM : ℓ1(I) × ℓ1(J) → R the
continuous bilinear mapping associating to each X ∈ ℓ1(I) and Y ∈ ℓ1(J) the real number ⟨X,MY ⟩ (also denoted by XTMY ,
where XT is the transposed matrix of the one-column matrix X). If the bounded matrix M = (ai,j)i,j∈I is skew symmetric
(MT = −M , i.e., for every i, j ∈ I , ai,j = −aj,i), then the bilinear mapping βM is also skew-symmetric (for every X, Y ∈ ℓ1(I),
βM(Y , X) = −βM(X, Y )).
2.2. The (two-player) zero-sum game associated to a bounded matrix
2.2.1. Mixed strategies on a set I
Given a set I , we denote by ∆I the set of X = (xi)i∈I ∈ [0, 1]I such thati∈I xi = 1. The elements of ∆I correspond to
the discrete probabilities on the set I: they are also called mixed strategies on I . For every i ∈ I , we denote by δi the element
of∆I such that δi(j) = 1 if j = i, and δi(j) = 0 if j ≠ i. Thus δi corresponds to the Dirac measure at point i. Dirac measures at
points of I are also called pure strategies on I .
Remark 1. In the normed space ℓ1(I), the subset ∆I is the closed convex hull of the set {δi : i ∈ I} of Dirac measures on I .
Besides, the closed unit ball of the normed space ℓ1(I) is the closed convex hull of the set {±δi : i ∈ I}.
2.2.2. Payoff function associated to a bounded matrix
Given a bounded real matrixM = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J , the restriction of βM to the set∆I ×∆J is the payoff function associated to
the matrix M; we denote it by GM . Notice that the mapping GM : ∆I × ∆J → R associates to every (X, Y ) ∈ ∆I × ∆J the
expectation ofM according to the (discrete) probability X ⊗ Y on the set I × J .
2.3. Saddle points
Given two sets A, B, consider a mapping G : A × B → R. A point (a, b) ∈ A × B is a saddle point of G if, for every x ∈ A
and y ∈ B, G(x, b) ≤ G(a, b) ≤ G(a, y).
We recall the following remarks, which are well known.
Remark 2. The set of saddle points of a real mapping G : A× B → R is a product set: if (a, b) and (c, d) are saddle points of
G, then (c, b) and (a, d) are also saddle points of G.
Remark 3. If G : A × A → R is skew symmetric, and if (a, b) is a saddle point of G, then (b, a) is also a saddle
point of G; thus (a, a) and (b, b) are saddle points of G, and, for every saddle point (a, b) of G, G(a, b) = 0 (because
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0 = G(b, b) ≤ G(a, b) ≤ G(a, a) = 0). In particular, in order to find all saddle points of G, it is sufficient to find saddle
points of G of the form (a, a).
2.3.1. Nash equilibria of a bounded matrix
A Nash equilibrium of a bounded matrix M = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J is a saddle point of GM : ∆I × ∆J → R. Thus, an element
(Λ,Γ ) ∈ ∆I ×∆J is a Nash equilibrium of the matrixM if and only if, for every X ∈ ∆I , Y ∈ ∆J ,
GM(X,Γ ) ≤ GM(Λ,Γ ) ≤ GM(Λ, Y ) or, equivalently, XTMΓ ≤ ΛTMΓ ≤ ΛTMY .
Definition 1. Given an element X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ∆I , the support of X is the set {i ∈ I : xi > 0}. We say that X ∈ ∆I is completely
mixed if the support of X is I .
We shall often use the following observation, which, given a Nash equilibrium of a matrix M , allows us to extract a
completely mixed Nash equilibrium of a submatrix ofM .
Proposition 1. Let M = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J be a bounded matrix. Let I ′ (respectively, J ′) be a subset of I (respectively, J). Denote by M ′
the submatrix MI ′×J ′ := (ai,j)i∈I ′,j∈J ′ .
(i) Given X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ∆I and Y = (yj)j∈J ∈ ∆J such that, for every i ∈ I \ I ′ (respectively, j ∈ J \ J ′), xi = 0 (respectively,
yj = 0), GM(X, Y ) = GM ′(XI ′ , YJ ′).
(ii) Assume that (Λ,Γ ) is a saddle point of GM : ∆I × ∆J → R and that I ′ (respectively, J ′) contains the support of Λ
(respectively, Γ ). Then (ΛI ′ ,ΓJ ′) is a saddle point of GM ′ .
Proof. (i) Since, for every i ∈ I \ I ′ (respectively, j ∈ J \ J ′), xi = 0 (respectively, yj = 0), GM ′(XI ′ , YJ ′) =
i∈I ′ xi(

j∈J ′ ai,jyj) =

i∈I ′ xi(

j∈J ai,jyj) =

i∈I xi(

j∈J ai,jyj) = GM(X, Y ).
(ii) Given some X ′ ∈ ∆I ′ , and denoting by X = (xi)i∈I the element of ∆I extending X ′, GM ′(X ′,ΓJ ′) = GM(X,Γ ) ≤
GM(Λ,Γ ) = GM ′(ΛI ′ ,ΓJ ′). In the same way, for every Y ′ ∈ ∆J ′ , GM ′(ΛI ′ ,ΓJ ′) ≤ GM ′(ΛI ′ , Y ′). 
2.3.2. Nash equilibria of a skew-symmetric matrix
Given X ∈ RI and α ∈ R, we write X ≤ α when all the coordinates of the vector X are≤ α.
The following result is well known, and we state it for sake of completeness.
Proposition 2. Let M = (ai,j)i,j∈I be a bounded skew-symmetric matrix. Let Λ ∈ ∆I . The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrix M.
(ii) For each X ∈ ∆I , XTMΛ ≤ 0.
(iii) For each Y ∈ ∆I ,ΛTMY ≥ 0.
(iv) MΛ ≤ 0.
Moreover, if Λ is completely mixed, then the following conditions are equivalent.
(i′) (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of M.
(ii′) MΛ = 0.
Proof. (i)⇔ (ii)⇔ (iii): Using the definition of Nash equilibria (see Section 2.3.1) andRemark 3, (Λ,Λ) is aNash equilibrium
of thematrixM if and only if, for every X, Y ∈ ∆I , XTMΛ ≤ 0 ≤ ΛTMY . Moreover, sinceM is skew symmetric, the statement
∀X ∈ ∆I , XTMΛ ≤ 0 is equivalent to ∀Y ∈ ∆I ,ΛTMY ≥ 0.
(ii)⇔ (iv): Using Remark 1, (ii) is equivalent, for all i ∈ I , to δTi MΛ ≤ 0; i.e.,MΛ ≤ 0.
(i′)⇒ (ii′): Let Λ = (λi)i∈I ∈ ∆I . The matrix M is skew symmetric, so ΛTMΛ = 0. This implies thati∈I λi(MΛ)i = 0. If
(Λ,Λ) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of M , then, for every i ∈ I , λi > 0 and (MΛ)i ≤ 0; thus the previous sum
gives (MΛ)i = 0. So,MΛ = 0.
(ii′)⇒ (i′): Use (iv)⇒ (i). 
3. Modular partitions of a skew-symmetric matrix
Given a skew-symmetricmatrixM = (ai,j)i,j∈I , we say that a subset J of I is amodule ofM if, for every s ∈ I\J , themapping
as,. : J → R associating to every j ∈ J the real number as,j is constant (the matrix M being skew symmetric, the mapping
a.,s : J → R is also constant, and a.,s = −as,.). A partition {Is : s ∈ S} of I in modules of M is called a modular partition
of M . We denote by Q = (qk,l)k,l∈S the quotient matrix such that, for all k, l ∈ S, qk,k = 0, and, if k ≠ l, qk,l = ai,j, where i
(respectively, j) is any element of Ik (respectively, Il). For every X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ∆I , we denote by X˙ the element (j∈Is xj)s∈S
of∆S .
Remark 4. This notion of ‘‘module’’ for skew-symmetric matrices (more generally for square matrices with a constant
diagonal) enters the framework of reversible labelled 2-structures, with real labels; see [8, p. 132], wheremodules are called
clans.
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Fig. 1. RPSW game.
Example 1. The Rock–Paper–Scissors–Well (RPSW) game is an extension of the well-known Rock–Paper–Scissors (RPS)
game defined by the tournament on {R, P, S} in which R beats S, S beats P , and P beats R: the matrix of the RPS game
is M3 =

0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0

. The RPSW game is obtained by adding the vertex ‘‘Well’’ (W ) in the RPS game: W beats R, W
beats S, and P beats W (see Fig. 1). So, the matrix of the RPSW game is M4 =
 0 −1 1 −1
1 0 −1 1
−1 1 0 −1
1 −1 1 0

. Clearly, {R,W } is
a module of M4, {{R,W }, {P}, {S}} is a modular partition of M4, and the quotient matrix of M4 through this partition is
Q =

0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0

= M3.
Lemma 1. Let M = (ai,j)i,j∈I be a bounded skew-symmetric matrix. Consider a modular partition {Is : s ∈ S} of M, and denote
by Q the quotient matrix of M through this partition. For every s ∈ S, denote by Ms the matrix M(Is×Is). If X, Y ∈ ℓ1(I), then
X˙, Y˙ ∈ ℓ1(S) and
GM(X, Y ) = GQ (X˙, Y˙ )+

s∈S
GMs(XIs , YIs).
Proof. Both members define continuous bilinear mappings on the normed space ℓ1(I); thus, using Remark 1, it is sufficient
to prove the equality for pure strategies δi, δj ∈ ∆I . Denote by s (respectively, t) the element of S such that i ∈ Is (respectively,
j ∈ It ); then δ˙i = δs (respectively, δ˙j = δt ). If s = t , then the second member is GQ (δs, δs) + GMs(δiIs , δjIs ) = 0 + ai,j =
GM(δi, δj). If s ≠ t , then the second member is GQ (δs, δt)+ GMs(δiIs , 0)+ GMt (0, δjIt ) = ai,j + 0+ 0 = GM(δi, δj). 
4. Computation of Nash equilibria by modular partitions
LetM = (ai,j)i,j∈I be a bounded skew-symmetric matrix. Let {Is : s ∈ S} be amodular partition ofM . LetQ be the quotient
matrix ofM through this modular partition. Then Q is also bounded and skew symmetric.
The matrixM is of the following form:
I0 I1 · · · Ik · · ·
I0 M0,0 M0,1 · · · M0,k · · ·
I1 M1,0 M1,1 · · · M1,k · · ·
...
. . .
Ik Mk,0 Mk,1 · · · Mk,k · · ·
...
. . .
where, for every k ∈ S, Mk,k = (ai,j)i,j∈Ik is a skew-symmetric submatrix of M , and where the matrices Mk,l, k ≠ l are
constant because Ik and Il are modules ofM: we denote by qk,l the term of the matrixMk,l.
The quotient matrix Q is of the following form:
0 1 · · · k · · ·
0 0 q0,1 · · · q0,k · · ·
1 q1,0 0 · · · q1,k · · ·
...
. . .
k qk,0 qk,1 · · · 0 · · ·
...
. . .
Given X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ∆I , for all i ∈ I , we define x˙(i) :=j∈Ii xj, and we write X˙ := (x˙(i))i∈S .
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4.1. Nash equilibria of the quotient
Theorem 1. Let Λ = (λi)i∈I ∈ ∆I . If (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrix M, then (Λ˙, Λ˙) is a Nash equilibrium of the
quotient matrix Q .
Proof. Since (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrixM , according to Proposition 2-(iii), for all Y ∈ ∆I ,ΛTMY ≥ 0.
This implies that, for all Y =

(yi)i∈I0
(yi)i∈I1
.
.
.
(yi)i∈Ik
.
.
.
 ∈ ∆I ,

k∈S
(λi)
T
i∈IkMk,k(yi)i∈Ik +

k,i∈S
i≠k
(λi)
T
i∈IkMk,i(yi)i∈Ii ≥ 0.
The matricesMk,i, k ≠ i are constant, with a term equal to qk,i; thus, this is equivalent to
k∈S
(λi)
T
i∈IkMk,k(yi)i∈Ik +

k,i∈S
i≠k
λ˙(k)qk,iy˙(i) ≥ 0. (1)
To prove that (Λ˙, Λ˙) is a Nash equilibrium of the quotient Q , it is sufficient to show that, for all Z = (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S , Λ˙TQZ
≥ 0; i.e.,
k,i∈S
i≠k
λ˙(k)qk,izi ≥ 0. (2)
First case: λ˙(k) ≠ 0 for all k ∈ S. Let (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S , and let Y =

z0
λ˙(0)
ΛI0
.
.
.
zk
λ˙(k)
ΛIk
.
.
.
 ∈ ∆I .
Then, applying inequality (1) to Y and noticing that, for every i ∈ S, y˙(i) = zi
λ˙(i)

j∈Ii λj = zi, we obtain
k∈S
zk
λ˙(k)
(λi)
T
i∈IkMk,k(λi)i∈Ik +

k,i∈S
i≠k
λ˙(k)qk,izi ≥ 0. (3)
Moreover, for all k ∈ S, (λi)Ti∈IkMk,k(λi)i∈Ik = 0, because the matrices Mk,k are skew symmetric. Thus, (3) proves inequality
(2).
Second case: The set S1 := {k ∈ S : λ˙(k) = 0} is non-empty.
Let (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S . Let Y be the element of∆I such that, for k ∈ S \ S1, YIk = zkλ˙(k)ΛIk ; and, for k ∈ S1, YIk = zkW , whereW
is any element of∆Ik . Then, for all k ∈ S1, y˙(k) = zk and (λi)Ti∈IkMk,k(yi)i∈Ik = 0 because λi = 0 for all i ∈ Ik and we use the
first case to conclude. 
4.2. Nash equilibria of modules
Theorem 2. Let I0 be a non-empty module of the matrix M. Let Λ = (λi)i∈I ∈ ∆I . If (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of M, and if
λ˙(0) > 0, then 1
λ˙(0)
(ΛI0 ,ΛI0) is a Nash equilibrium of M0,0 = M(I0×I0).
Proof. Since (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium ofM , according to Proposition 2-(iv),MΛ ≤ 0. This implies that
M0,0ΛI0 +

i∈S
i≠0
q0,iλ˙(i)

1
1
...
1

I0
≤ 0. (4)
To prove that 1
λ˙(0)
(ΛI0 ,ΛI0) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrixM0,0, it is sufficient to show that
M0,0
1
λ˙(0)
ΛI0 ≤ 0 or, equivalently,M0,0ΛI0 ≤ 0.
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According to Theorem 1, the quotient matrix Q has a Nash equilibrium (Λ˙, Λ˙).
First case: The Nash equilibrium of the quotient matrix Q is completely mixed. So, using Proposition 2-(ii′), Q Λ˙ = 0. Then
i∈S
i≠0
q0,iλ˙(i) = 0,
and (4) gives the result.
Second case: TheNash equilibriumof the quotientmatrixQ is not completelymixed. Let S ′ := {i ∈ S : λ˙(i) ≠ 0}. Consider the
submatrixM ′ induced on I ′ = ∪i∈S′ Ii. So, I0 is amodule ofM ′. Using Proposition 1, ((λ˙(i))i∈S′ , (λ˙(i))i∈S′) is a completelymixed
Nash equilibrium of the quotient ofM ′. Now, the first case proves that 1
λ˙(0)
(ΛI0 ,ΛI0) is a Nash equilibrium ofM0,0. 
4.3. Recovering Nash equilibria
Theorem 3. Let Γ = (γi)i∈S ∈ ∆S . If, for every k ∈ S, Λk ∈ ∆Ik and (Λk,Λk) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrix
Mk,k = M(Ik×Ik), and if (Γ ,Γ ) is a Nash equilibrium of the quotient matrix Q , then ((γiΛi)i∈S, (γiΛi)i∈S) is a Nash equilibrium
of the matrix M.
Proof. For any k ∈ S, (Λk,Λk) is a Nash equilibrium of the matrixMk,k, so
∀k ∈ S Mk,kΛk ≤ 0. (5)
Similarly, (Γ ,Γ ) is a Nash equilibrium of the quotient matrix Q . Then QΓ ≤ 0. It follows that Γ = (γi)i∈S satisfies
∀k ∈ S

i∈S
i≠k
qk,iγi ≤ 0. (6)
To prove that ((γiΛi)i∈S, (γiΛi)i∈S) is a Nash equilibrium of M , it is sufficient to show that M

γ0Λ
0
γ1Λ
1
.
.
.
γkΛ
k
.
.
.
 ≤ 0; i.e., ∀k ∈ S,
γkMk,kΛk + i∈S
i≠k
γiMk,iΛi ≤ 0.
Noticing that, for all k, i ∈ S (k ≠ i), γk ≥ 0 andMk,iΛi is equal to qk,i

1
1
.
.
.
1

Ik
, we can conclude by adding (5) and (6). 
5. Values
5.1. Value of a mapping
Given two sets A, B and a mapping G : A× B → R, then
v−(G) := sup
x∈A
inf
y∈BG(x, y) ≤ v
+(G) := inf
y∈B supx∈A
G(x, y).
We call the real number v−(G) (respectively, v+(G)) the lower value (respectively, the upper value) of G. If v−(G) = v+(G),
then this real number is called the value of G; we denote it by v(G), and G is said to have a value.
Remark 5. Assume that G : A× A → R is skew symmetric. Then v+(G) = −v−(G); thus v−(G) ≤ 0 ≤ v+(G). So, if G has a
value, this value is 0.
Remark 6. If (a, b) is a saddle point of G, then
sup
x∈A
inf
y∈BG(x, y) = G(a, b) = infy∈B supx∈A G(x, y).
Thus G has a value equal to G(a, b) for any saddle point of G.
5.2. Value of a matrix
If G : ∆I ×∆J → R is the payoff function associated to some bounded matrixM = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J , then we denote by v+(M)
(respectively, v−(M), v(M)) the real number v+(G) (respectively, v−(G), v(G)). When v−(M) = v+(M),M is said to have a
value.
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Remark 7. Given a bounded matrixM , then−∥M∥∞ ≤ v−(M) ≤ v+(M) ≤ ∥M∥∞.
Notation 1. Given a set I , denote by∆finI the set of elements X ∈ ∆I having a finite support.
Proposition 3. Let M = (ai,j)i∈I,j∈J be a bounded matrix. Then
v−(M) = sup
X∈∆I
inf
j∈J GM(X, δj) = sup
X∈∆finI
inf
j∈J GM(X, δj).
In the same way,
v+(M) = inf
Y∈∆J
sup
i∈I
GM(δi, Y ) = inf
Y∈∆finJ
sup
i∈I
GM(δi, Y ).
Proof. For every X ∈ ∆I , the mapping G(X, .) : ∆J → R is convex, and continuous; since ∆J is the closed convex
hull of the set of Dirac measures on J (see Remark 1), it follows that v−(M) = supX∈∆I infj∈J GM(X, δj). The equality
supX∈∆I infj∈J GM(X, δj) = supX∈∆finI infj∈J GM(X, δj) follows from the fact that, for every real number ε > 0, and every
X = (xi)i∈I ∈ ∆I , there exists a finite subset F0 of I such thati∈I\F0 xi < ε. The proof of the statement for v+(M) is
similar. 
5.3. A criterion for skew-symmetric bounded matrices
Proposition 4. Let M = (ai,j)i,j∈I be a bounded skew-symmetric matrix. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) The matrix M has a value.
(ii) For every real number ε > 0, there exists X ∈ ∆I such that MX ≤ ε.
Proof. The matrix M has a value if and only if v−(M) ≥ 0. Using Proposition 3, this is equivalent to the following:
∀ε > 0 ∃X ∈ ∆I ∀i ∈ I ⟨X,Mδi⟩ ≥ −ε. Since the matrix M is skew-symmetric, the last statement is equivalent to the
following: ∀ε > 0 ∃X ∈ ∆I MX ≤ ε. 
6. Computation of values and upper values by modular partitions
LetM = (ai,j)i,j∈I be a bounded skew-symmetric matrix. Let {Is : s ∈ S} be amodular partition ofM . LetQ be the quotient
matrix ofM through this modular partition. The notation is the same as in Section 4.
6.1. Value of the quotient
Theorem 4. If the matrix M has a value, then the quotient matrix Q has a value.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Since the matrix M has a value, v−(M) ≥ −ε. This implies that there exists X ∈ ∆I such that, for all
Y ∈ ∆I , XTMY ≥ −ε.
It follows that, for all Y =

(yi)i∈I0
(yi)i∈I1
.
.
.
(yi)i∈Ik
.
.
.
 ∈ ∆I ,

k∈S
(xi)Ti∈IkMk,k(yi)i∈Ik +

k,i∈S
i≠k
x˙(k)qk,iy˙(i) ≥ −ε. (7)
To prove that the quotient matrix Q has a value, we prove that, for all Z = (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S , X˙TQZ ≥ −ε, or, equivalently,
k,i∈S
i≠k
x˙(k)qk,izi ≥ −ε. (8)
First case: x˙(k) ≠ 0 for all k ∈ S. Let (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S , and let Y =

z0
x˙(0)
XI0
.
.
.
zk
x˙(k)
XIk
.
.
.
 ∈ ∆I .
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Then, applying (7) to Y and noticing that, for every i ∈ S, y˙(i) = zix˙(i)

j∈Ii xj = zi, we obtain
k∈S
zk
x˙(k)
(xi)Ti∈IkMk,k(xi)i∈Ik +

k,i∈S
i≠k
x˙(k)qk,izi ≥ −ε.
Moreover, for all k ∈ S, (xi)Ti∈IkMk,k(xi)i∈Ik = 0 because the matricesMk,k are skew symmetric. So, we obtain inequality (8).
Second case: The set S1 := {k ∈ S : x˙(k) = 0} is non-empty.
Let (zi)i∈S ∈ ∆S . Let Y be the element of∆I such that, for k ∈ S \ S1, YIk = zkx˙(k)XIk ; and, for k ∈ S1, YIk = zkW , whereW
is any element of∆Ik . Then, for all k ∈ S1, y˙(k) = zk and (xi)Ti∈IkMk,k(yi)i∈Ik = 0, because xi = 0 for all i ∈ Ik, and we use the
first case to conclude. 
6.2. Recovering upper values
Theorem 5. For every s ∈ S, let Ms := M(Is×Is). Let D be the diagonal matrix diags∈S(v+(Ms)). Then v+(M) = v+(Q + D).
Proof. Using Proposition 3,
v+(M) = inf
Y∈∆I
sup
i∈I
GM(δi, Y )
= inf
Y∈∆I
sup
s∈S
i∈Is

GQ (δs, Y˙ )+ GMs(δi, YIs)

= inf
Y∈∆I
sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Y˙ )+ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, YIs)

.
On the other hand, using Proposition 3 and Lemma 1,
v+(Q + D) = inf
Z=(zs)s∈∆S
sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs
 = inf
Z=(zs)s∈∆finS
sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs

.
We first show that v+(M) ≤ v+(Q + D). Let Z = (zs)s∈S ∈ ∆finS . Let S1 be the (finite) support of Z . Let ε ∈ R∗+. Let us prove
that
v+(M) ≤ sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs
+ ε.
For each s ∈ S1, let Us ∈ ∆Is , satisfying
sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi,Us) ≤ infU∈∆Is supi∈Is
GMs(δi,U)+
ε
zs
. (9)
Let Y0 be the element of ∆I such that, for each s ∈ S1, Y0Is = zsUs (and, for each s ∈ S \ S1, Y0Is = 0); notice that Y˙0 = Z .
Then, for all s ∈ S,
zs sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi,Us) ≤ zs infU∈∆Is supi∈Is
GMs(δi,U)+ ε = v+(Ms)zs + ε. (10)
Since, for every s ∈ S, Y0Is = zsUs, this is equivalent to
GQ (δs, Z)+ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, Y0Is) ≤ GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs + ε,
so
sup
s∈S
(GQ (δs, Y˙0)+ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, Y0Is)) ≤ sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs
+ ε.
It follows that
v+(M) = inf
Y∈∆I
sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Y˙ )+ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, YIs)
 ≤ sup
s∈S

GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs
+ ε. (11)
We now show that v+(Q + D) ≤ v+(M). Let Y ∈ ∆I . Let Z := Y˙ . Let us prove that
sup
s∈S
(GQ (δs, Z)+ v+(Ms)zs) ≤ sup
s∈S
(GQ (δs, Y˙ )+ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, YIs)).
This follows from the fact that, for every s ∈ S,
zs inf
U∈∆Is
sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi,U) ≤ sup
i∈Is
GMs(δi, YIs). 
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Corollary 1. If, for all s ∈ S, the matrix Ms := M(Is×Is) has a value, and if the quotient matrix Q has a value, then the matrix M
has a value.
Proof. For all s ∈ S, the matrix Ms has a value, so v+(Ms) = v(Ms) = 0; thus D is the null matrix. The quotient matrix Q
has a value, so v+(Q ) = v(Q ) = 0; thus v+(M) = v(Q ) = 0, i.e., the matrixM has a value. 
7. Computation of Nash equilibria and values in oriented graphs
7.1. Oriented graphs
A directed graph is an irreflexive binary relation → on a set V . Elements of V are called vertices of the directed graph
(V ,→). The matrix M = (ai,j)i,j∈V of a directed graph G = (V ,→) is defined by ai,j = 1 if i → j, ai,j = −1 if j → i, and
otherwise ai,j = 0. This matrix is bounded and ∥M∥∞ = 1 if M ≠ 0. We denote by v+(G) (respectively, v−(G), v(G)) the
upper value (respectively, lower value, value) of the matrixM of this graph. A Nash equilibrium (respectively, a value) ofM
is called a Nash equilibrium of the graph G. An oriented graph is an irreflexive and anti-symmetric binary relation→ on a
set V . The matrix of an oriented graph is skew-symmetric.
Notation 2. Given a oriented graph (V ,→), and two distinct vertices i, j of V , we write i · · · j if (i 9 j and j 9 i). Given a
subset A of V , and i ∈ V , we write i → A if, for every j ∈ A, i → j; we write i · · · A if, for every j ∈ A, i · · · j; and we write
A → i if, for every j ∈ A, j → i.
Remark 8. Given an oriented graph (V ,→), a subset J of V is a module of (the matrix of) the oriented graph (V ,→) if and
only if, for every i ∈ V \ J , i → J or J → i or i · · · J . This notion of ‘‘module’’ for graphs seems to appear in [1] and in [10].
A tournament is an oriented graph (V ,→) such that, for any distinct vertices i, j ∈ V , i → j or j → i.
An oriented graph is indecomposable if every proper non-empty module of this oriented graph is a singleton.
7.2. The Rock–Paper–Scissors–Well game
The matrix of the RPS game (see Example 1) is M3 =

0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0

, and it is well known that this game has a
unique Nash equilibrium equal to (Λ,Λ), where Λ = ( 13 , 13 , 13 ). The matrix of the RPSW game (the extension of the
RPS game defined in Example 1) is M4 =
 0 −1 1 −1
1 0 −1 1
−1 1 0 −1
1 −1 1 0

. The quotient matrix of M4 through the modular partition
{{R,W }, {P}, {S}} isQ =

0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0

= M3. The Nash equilibria of themodules are, respectively, (0, 1; 0, 1), (1; 1), and
(1; 1); thus Theorem 3 implies thatM4 has a unique Nash equilibriumwhich is (Γ ,Γ ), where Γ = ( 13 · (0, 1), 13 ·1, 13 ·1) =
(0, 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ).
7.3. A infinite tournament with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium
Consider the tournament T = (N,→) such that, for every i ∈ N, for every j ≥ 2i+2, 2i → j, j → 2i+1, and 2i+1→ 2i
(see Fig. 2). For every even integer n, denote by Vn the subset {i ∈ N : i ≥ n}; then, for every even integer n, Vn+2 is a module
of the subgraph Tn induced by T on Vn; moreover, the quotient tournament Tn/Tn+2 is isomorphic with the cycle C3 and the
mapping hn : V → Vn associating to each i ∈ N the element i+ n is an isomorphism of graphs.
Fig. 2. A completely mixed Nash equilibrium in an infinite tournament.
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Example 2. The tournament T has a unique Nash equilibrium (Λ,Λ) ∈ ∆N ×∆N, andΛ = (λi)i∈N satisfies λ2i = λ2i+1 =
1
3i+1 for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Uniqueness. Let Λ = (λi)i∈N ∈ ∆N. If (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of T , then, since T/T2 is the cycle C3, Theorem 1
implies that λ0 = λ1 = 13 , and

i≥2 λi = 1/3. Nash equilibria are preserved by the isomorphism h2 : V → V2; thus every
Nash equilibrium (Γ ,Γ ) of T2,Γ = (γi)i∈V2 , satisfies γ2 = γ3 = 13 . Since T2 is a module of T such that

i∈V2 λi = 13 > 0,
Theorem 2 implies that 11/3ΛT2 is a Nash equilibrium of the graph T2; thus 3λ2 = 3λ3 = 13 . An induction shows that, for
every n ∈ N, λ2n = λ2n+1 = 13n+1 .
Existence. It is easy to check that ( 1
3⌊i/2⌋+1 )i∈N is a Nash equilibrium of T . 
More generally, modular decompositions for oriented graphs, or for skew-symmetric matrices (see [6]), allow one to
compute Nash equilibria of the graphs, provided that the modules themselves and the associated quotients admit Nash
equilibria, and that the ‘‘decomposition tree’’ is anti-well-founded.
The infinite tournament of Fig. 2 with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium has plenty of modules. Thus, the following
question is natural.
Question: Is there an infinite indecomposable tournament with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium?
Remark 9. A tournament with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium is acyclically indecomposable in the sense of [5]: every
modulewith at least two elements has a cycle (and thus has at least three elements). Indeed, given a tournament T = (V ,→)
with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium (λi)i∈V , and given a module I of T with at least two elements, then Theorem 2
implies that 1
i∈I
(λi)i∈I is a (completely mixed) equilibrium of the tournament induced by T on the module I; thus the
tournament (I,→) is not a chain, and hence it has a cycle.
7.4. A criterion for oriented graphs G such that v+(G) = 1
The following criterion is useful in Example 3, which will be used in the computation of the upper value of a module in
Example 6.
Proposition 5. Given an oriented graph G = (V ,→), the following statements are equivalent.
(i) v+(G) = 1 (or v−(G) = −1).
(ii) For every finite subset F of V , there exists j ∈ V \ F such that j → F .
Proof. Denote by fin(V ) the set of finite subsets of V . Denoting by (ai,j)i,j∈V the (skew-symmetric, bounded) matrix M
associated to the graph G, the following statements are equivalent.
v+(G) = 1 or, equivalently, v−(G) ≤ −1
∀X ∈ ∆finV infj∈V

i∈V
xiai,j ≤ −1
∀X ∈ ∆finV infj∈V

i∈V
i→j
xi −

i∈V
j→i
xi ≤ −1.
Given some X ∈ ∆finV , and denoting by F the support of X , the set SX := {

i∈V
i→j
xi− i∈V
j→i
xi : j ∈ V } = { i∈F
i→j
xi− i∈F
j→i
xi :
j ∈ V } is finite (because F is finite); thus there exists j0 ∈ V such that inf SX =  i∈V
i→j0
xi − i∈V
j0→i
xi, so we obtain the
following extra equivalent statements:
∀X ∈ ∆finV ∃j ∈ V

i∈V
i→j
xi −

i∈V
j→i
xi ≤ −1
∀X ∈ ∆finV ∃j ∈ V

i∈V
i→j
xi −

i∈V
j→i
xi = −1.
Given some non-empty finite subset F of V , we may consider the element XF of∆V such that, for every i ∈ V , XF (i) = 1|F | if
i ∈ F and 0 if i ∈ V \ F . Thus we get the final equivalent statement:
∀F ∈ fin(V ) ∃j ∈ V j → F . 
A strict order is a binary relation which is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive.
M. Morillon, P. Spinelli / Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 1201–1212 1211
Example 3. Given a non-empty set V and a linear strict order< on V without any last element, consider the binary relation
→ on V which is the reverse strict order: for every i, j ∈ V , i → j ⇔ j < i. Notice that the matrixM = (ai,j)i,j∈V is defined
as follows: for every i, j ∈ V , if i = j, then ai,j = 0; if i < j, then ai,j = −1; and if i > j, then ai,j = 1. Using Proposition 5,
v+(M) = 1. Note that this example corresponds to the one given by Wald [20, p. 182].
Remark 10 (Nash Equilibria of a Strict-Order). Let (I, <) be a strict order. Let Λ ∈ ∆I . Then (Λ,Λ) is a Nash equilibrium of
(the game associated to) the oriented graph< if and only if the elements of the support ofΛ aremaximal elements of (I, <).
Example 4. Applying Proposition 5, we deduce that the tournament T described in Fig. 3 satisfies v+(T ) = 1; thus this
graph does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 3. A tournament T such that v+(T ) = 1.
Example 5. The random tournament Tr = (N,→) onN is characterized up to isomorphy (see [9]) by the following property:
for any finite disjoint subsets F ,G of N, there exists i ∈ N such that i → F and G → i. Using Proposition 5, v+(Tr) = 1; thus
Tr does not have a value (and thus Tr does not have a Nash equilibrium).
Remark 11. The random tournament on N is an indecomposable oriented graph.
In the sense of Baire or of the Lebesgue measure, almost every tournament on N is isomorphic with the random
tournament. Thus, almost every tournament T on N is indecomposable and satisfies v+(T ) = 1; in particular, T does not
have a value.
7.5. An infinite ‘‘circular’’ tournament
Given a linearly ordered set (I,≤) with a first element 0 and a last element ∞, the circular tournament associated to
(I,≤) is the tournament (I,→) where→ is obtained from the strict order > by reversing the relation between 0 and∞
(i.e., 0→∞); see Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. An infinite circular tournament.
Example 6. Consider the usual order on V = N ∪ {∞}, with first element 0 and a last element∞. Let T := (V ,→) be the
associated circular tournament (see Fig. 4). The tournament T satisfies v+(T ) = 1/9 (thus v−(T ) = −1/9, so T does not
have any value; hence T does not have any Nash equilibrium).
1212 M. Morillon, P. Spinelli / Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 1201–1212
Proof. Consider the matrix M = (ai,j)i,j∈V of the oriented graph T . Consider the modular partition V = I0 ⊔ I1 ⊔ I2, where
I0 = {0}, I1 = N∗, and I2 = {∞} of this matrix. Then the quotient of M through this partition is Q =

0 −1 1
1 0 −1
−1 1 0

, and
v+(I0) = v+(I2) = 0. SinceM1 is the matrix of the strict order (N∗, >), Example 3 of Section 7.4 shows that v+(I1) = 1; so
Q +D =

0 −1 1
1 1 −1
−1 1 0

. The (unique) Nash equilibrium of Q +D is (Λ,Γ ), whereΛ = ( 49 , 13 , 29 ) and Γ = ( 29 , 13 , 49 ); thus
the value of this (non-skew-symmetric) matrix isΛT (Q + D)Γ = 1/9 (see Remark 6); so v+(T ) = 1/9. 
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